Can This Marriage Be Saved? Federalism and the Future of U.S. Health Policy Under the Affordable Care Act by Rosenbaum, Sara
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 
Volume 15 Issue 1 Article 15 
2014 
Can This Marriage Be Saved? Federalism and the Future of U.S. 
Health Policy Under the Affordable Care Act 
Sara Rosenbaum 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst 
Recommended Citation 
Sara Rosenbaum, Can This Marriage Be Saved? Federalism and the Future of U.S. Health Policy Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 167 (2014). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol15/iss1/15 
The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the 
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing. 
  167
Can This Marriage Be Saved? Federalism 
and the Future of U.S. Health Policy 
Under the Affordable Care Act 
Sara Rosenbaum* 
I. Introduction .................................................................... 167 
II. The Act’s Delicate Federal-State Regulatory 
Partnership ..................................................................... 173 
III. The Endangered Federal-State Medicaid 
Relationship .................................................................... 184 
IV. Discussion ....................................................................... 204 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In law, as in life, relationships are everything. 
 
As with all transformational laws, the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act,1 hereinafter referred to by its popular 
name, the Affordable Care Act (ACA or the Act), derives its 
power from the extent to which it realigns prior relationships 
and from adding new rights and duties: Between individuals 
and government through the creation of a right to accessible, 
affordable health insurance and a concomitant “personal 
responsibility” to secure it;2 between the insurance industry 
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 *  Harold and Jane Hirsh Professor, Health Law and Policy, The George 
Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services, 
Washington D.C. 
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). The Obama Administration refers to these two 
laws jointly as The Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., 78 Fed. Reg. 27,486 (May 10, 
2013). 
 2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act sec. 1501, § 5000A, 124 
Stat. at 244–50 (adding section 5000A to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); 
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and the government through reforms aimed at assuring access 
to affordable coverage;3 between larger employers and workers 
through the Act’s “shared responsibility” requirements;4 and 
between health care providers and public and private insurers 
through provisions aimed at long-term restructuring in how 
health care is organized and paid for.5 
But it is fair to say that no relationship within the health 
care system is more affected by the Act than that between the 
federal government and state governments. Indeed, the ACA 
establishes a legal approach to national health reform that, at 
its core, rests on the shoulders of this relationship. First, the 
Act expands the pre-existing federal-state partnership in the 
regulation of health insurance while establishing a new 
Marketplace for affordable coverage.6 Second, the Act expands 
the joint federal-state investment in health care for the poor 
(this time, with the lion’s share coming from the federal 
partner) through an expanded Medicaid program.7 As of May 
2013, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated 
that by 2022, twenty-five million Americans will gain coverage 
as a result of this recalibrated set of relationships.8 
                                                          
see §1401, 124 Stat. at 213–20 (establishing a legal entitlement on the part of 
qualified individuals to advanced premium tax credits by amending chapter 1 
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); §1402, 124 Stat. at 220–24 (adding an 
entitlement to cost-sharing reduction assistance in the case of eligible 
individuals). 
 3. § 1001, 124 Stat. at 130–38 (amending the Public Health Service Act 
(PHSA)); § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154–61 (same); § 1562(e), 124 Stat. at 270 
(amending the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to 
apply certain PHSA insurance reforms to ERISA plans). 
 4. § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253–56 (amending chapter 43 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 to add a shared employer responsibility to contribute 
toward the cost of coverage in certain cases). 
 5. See, e.g., § 3021, 124 Stat. at 389–95 (establishing the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation); § 3022, 124 Stat. at 395–99 (establishing 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program); § 3023, 124 Stat. at 399–403 
(establishing a national pilot program on payment bundling); § 3025, 124 Stat. 
at 408–13 (establishing a readmissions reduction program). 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. The CBO’s original cost estimates associated with the Act put the 
total number of newly insured Americans at thirty-one million. Letter from 
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to the Honorable Harry 
Reid, U.S. Senate Majority Leader, tbl.3 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11307/reid_lett
er_hr3590.pdf (estimating a reduction of thirty-one million uninsured 
nonelderly people by 2019). Following the United States Supreme Court’s 
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Of course, to achieve the Act’s intended effects, these 
legislative relationships actually need to become operational. 
But as of spring 2013, the political animus that pervaded the 
country, coupled with the near mortal blow dealt to the Act’s 
structure by the United States Supreme Court’s Medicaid 
ruling in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius (NFIB),9 placed half of all states on track to refuse to 
either implement their own Health Insurance Marketplaces10 
or adopt the Medicaid coverage expansions for poor adults.11 
Moreover, the vast majority of states had not yet taken steps to 
implement the far-reaching insurance reforms specified under 
the Act; indeed, as of the winter of 2013, only one state had 
done so.12 
                                                          
decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 32 S. Ct. 
2566 (2012), the CBO revised this figure down to about thirty million as a 
result of the Court’s holding that states could opt out of the mandatory 2014 
Medicaid adult expansion. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE 
INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED 
FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 20 tbl.3 (2012) [hereinafter CBO 
ESTIMATES], available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/43472-07-24-2012-CoverageEstimates.pdf. In May 2013, the CBO 
further revised the figure down to twenty-five million by 2022 as a result of 
new estimates lowering the number of individuals with employer health 
insurance. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 1 tbl.1 (2013), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44190_
EffectsAffordableCareActHealthInsuranceCoverage_2.pdf. 
 9. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–09 (2012) (holding that the Medicaid expansion 
was optional, not mandatory, for states). 
 10. Health Insurance Marketplaces are also known as the American 
Health Benefit Exchanges under the ACA. See Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act § 1311, 124 Stat. at 173–81. In 2012, the Obama 
Administration introduced the term “Health Insurance Marketplace” in order 
to make the concept more understandable to the public, most of whom had 
absolutely no idea what an Exchange was. See, e.g., Press Release, President 
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Supreme Court Ruling on the 
Affordable Care Act (June 28, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2012/06/28/remarks-president-supreme-court-ruling-
affordable-care-act. 
 11. See supra note 9. 
 12. KATIE KEITH ET AL., COMMONWEALTH FUND, IMPLEMENTING THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: STATE ACTION ON THE 2014 MARKET REFORMS 2 
(2013), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/
Publications/Issue%20Brief/2013/1662_Keith_implementing_ACA_state_actio
n_2014_reform_brief_v2.pdf (finding that only one state had implemented all 
seven 2014 market reforms as of October 2012). 
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The pressure on Republican state leaders to resist any sort 
of accommodation to the Act is intense,13 with unending 
polemics against cooperation delivered by its ideological 
opponents,14 as well as repeated, hammering blows against any 
move toward cooperative federalism administered by the 
Republican-controlled United States House of Representatives. 
By May 2013, the House had voted thirty-seven separate times 
to repeal the Act in its entirety.15 These intense and 
unrelenting attacks in turn appear to be having their intended 
effect, helping push over two dozen states by mid-2013 to act 
                                                          
 13. See, e.g., Sandhya Somashekhar, GOP Governors’ Endorsements of 
Medicaid Expansion Deepen Rifts Within Party, WASH. POST, June 3, 2013, 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-02/national/39697956_1_medicaid-
expansion-medicaid-plan-gop-governors. 
 14. See, e.g., MICHAEL F. CANNON, CATO INST., 50 VETOES: HOW STATES 
CAN STOP THE OBAMA HEALTH CARE LAW (2013), available at 
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/50-vetoes-white-paper_1.pdf. 
Perhaps the most thorough documentation of how the Act’s opponents have 
turned its federalism structure into a potent weapon against itself can be 
found in 50 Vetoes, which focuses on how states can stop the ACA from taking 
effect by refusing to expand Medicaid and by refusing to establish Health 
Insurance Marketplaces (the newest term for what are known as “exchanges” 
under the Act). Id. One might wonder why stopping states from establishing 
their own Marketplaces would undermine the Act, since as discussed later in 
this article, the law provides for default federal administration of the new 
Marketplace system in any state that elects not to operate its own. See infra 
notes 62–87 and accompanying text. The answer lies in a companion legal 
theory, now working its way through the courts, that the Act’s terms prohibit 
federally facilitated Marketplaces (as they are known) from offering premium 
subsidies to low- and moderate-income families and individuals or collecting 
penalties on larger employers that do not offer coverage. Compare Timothy 
Jost, Tax Credits in Federally Facilitated Exchanges Are Consistent with the 
Affordable Care Act’s Language and History, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 18, 
2012, 7:27 PM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/07/18/tax-credits-in-
federally-facilitated-exchanges-are-consistent-with-the-affordable-care-acts-
language-and-history/ (arguing that nothing in the Act bars subsidies and 
penalties in federally facilitated Marketplaces), with Michael Cannon & 
Jonathan Adler, The Illegal IRS Rule to Expand Tax Credits Under the 
PPACA: A Response to Timothy Jost, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Aug. 1, 2012, 10:52 
AM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2012/08/01/the-illegal-irs-rule-to-expand-tax-
credits-under-the-ppaca-a-response-to-timothy-jost/ (responding to Professor 
Jost’s arguments). 
 15. Sarah Kliff, Yes, the 37th Obamacare Repeal Vote Matters, WASH. 
POST WONKBLOG (May 16, 2013, 10:55 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/16/yes-the-37th-obamacare-repeal-vote-matters/ 
(arguing that each repeal vote has helped fuel uncertainty and further popular 
resistance to implementation). 
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against the social, political, economic, and moral interests of 
their own populations.16 
For better or worse, cooperative federalism is the platform 
on which the Affordable Care Act rests. For this reason, 
mending the federalism relationship, or at least building a 
compensatory legislative structure to overcome its 
shortcomings if détente fails, has become vital. It is important 
to think about what such an alternative arrangement might 
look like even if, at the moment, it appears that prospects for 
any federal legislative intervention are dim at best.17 One can 
only hope. 
In the spirit of hoping for a chance at further legislative 
reform if the marriage cannot be saved, I take a closer look at 
the two federalism relationships—one regulatory, the other 
investment—that lie at the heart of the Act. I surmise that 
even if sputtering and fragile, the regulatory partnership 
actually is built to weather current conditions and that 
ultimately, it will enable full implementation of the market 
reforms that the Act sets in motion. 
I also conclude, however, that at least where coverage of 
poor adults and their families is concerned, the Medicaid 
relationship is sufficiently under water to necessitate a federal 
fallback system, comparable in spirit to the federal fallback 
that has been designed for the regulatory side of the ledger. 
Creating such a fallback is essential if the nation is to avert the 
terrible spectacle of allowing any individual state to exclude its 
poorest residents from coverage. Of course, we have been down 
this road before; it took states many years after Medicaid’s 
1965 enactment to implement the program fully. Indeed, 
                                                          
 16. See, e.g., Elise Viebeck, Perry Doubles Down Against ObamaCare’s 
Medicaid Expansion, The HILL (Apr. 1, 2013, 6:10 PM), http://thehill.com/
blogs/healthwatch/medicaid/291257-perry-doubles-down-against-medicaid-
expansion (reporting on the Governor’s April 2013 press conference 
announcing his opposition despite the enormous gains to Texas). At the press 
conference, a number of high-ranking federal officials joined him, most 
notably, Senator Ted Cruz, perhaps the most outspoken opponent of the Act in 
the United States Senate at the time of this writing and a leader of the Tea 
Party movement. Id. Viebeck, having talked with colleagues in Texas, noted 
that during the press conference, Governor Perry was absolutely flanked by 
prominent Republicans and looked as though he was being held-up. Id. 
 17. See Jonathan Weisman & Robert Pear, Partisan Gridlock Thwarts 
Effort to Alter Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2013, at A1. 
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Arizona did not implement Medicaid until 1982.18 One might 
argue that in the name of federalism the nation should 
continue to take this long view and nudge states into coming 
around through an array of incentives. 
But I argue here that what may have been tolerable in 
Medicaid’s early years—when the entire health insurance 
system was still evolving and our understanding of the role of 
health insurance in access to care was so much more limited—
is no longer tolerable in 2013 when we stand on the precipice of 
seeing millions shut out of coverage under health reform. To 
allow one, a handful, or two dozen states to lock the poor out of 
coverage in the name of federalism is simply unthinkable, 
especially now that the nation has managed to build a viable, 
alternative mechanism for extending near-universal affordable 
coverage to the population. In 1965 there was no viable, 
alternative pathway to achieving affordable coverage for 
uninsured, low-income individuals. Now there is. 
The Court’s Medicaid ruling in NFIB19 can be thought of as 
having launched one of the most sobering federalism 
experiments the nation has yet undertaken. But we need to 
collectively call the social experiment to a halt now, just as 
researchers presumably would do in the case of any 
fundamentally unethical research design. One could argue that 
the decision allows the country to test the practical 
consequences of constitutional federalism, to determine 
whether large financial incentives (memorably described by 
Justice Kagan as “a boatload” of federal funds during the NFIB 
oral argument)20 are sufficient to overcome regional, 
                                                          
 18. Erick Eckholm, Late Starter in Medicaid, Arizona Shows the Way, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1991, at A1. 
 19. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text. 
 20. For Justice Kagan’s memorable characterization of the Act’s Medicaid 
eligibility expansion funding levels during oral argument on March 28, 2012, 
see Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Florida et al. v. Dep’t. of Health & 
Human Servs., 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-
400.pdf. Clearly, this was not enough for her to vote with the dissent on this 
issue. Indeed, Medicaid’s sheer size, and the states’ high dependence on the 
program, became a crucial aspect of the majority opinion finding that the 2014 
adult expansion constituted an unconstitutional coercion. See Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After 
NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 873–76, 906, 912–16 (2013) (discussing the 
conditions under which a federal law conceivably could result in 
unconstitutional coercion, including the size of federal funding involved, 
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philosophical, and cultural differences about the federal-state 
relationship. But this is not a question that is worthy of answer 
in a just society. It is too late in our ethical evolution even to 
ask questions such as the one that effectively has been posed in 
the wake of the decision. The notion of testing the full 
consequences of constitutional federalism pales when compared 
to the broader public interest in promoting population health 
and social justice. The states that, as of mid-2013, are on the 
road to excluding the poor account for more than half of all 
uninsured people in the United States.21 
II. THE ACT’S DELICATE FEDERAL-STATE REGULATORY 
PARTNERSHIP 
In many respects, the basic approach to the regulation of 
health insurance in the United States remains undisturbed 
under the Act. Indeed, the Act builds on a pre-existing 
federalism framework. It is true that where ERISA-governed 
health plans are concerned,22 federal law continues to displace 
state insurance regulation in the case of self-insured plans and 
to completely preempt state law remedies generally, regardless 
of the insured status of ERISA health benefit plans.23 
At the same time, the ACA preserves the partnering 
structure codified under the McCarran-Ferguson Act,24 while 
considerably ramping-up the level of federal intervention into 
the business of insurance regulation.25 This ramped-up 
                                                          
changing the terms of cooperating in an “entrenched” federal program, and 
attempting to tie separate programs into a package deal). 
 21. Robert Pear, States’ Policies on Health Care Exclude Poorest, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 25, 2013, at A1. 
 22. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
governs health plans sponsored by private employers other than churches. 29 
U.S.C. § 1002 (2012). 
 23. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004); Pilot Life 
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47–57 (1987); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739–40 (1985). For a discussion of ERISA, 
preemption of state insurance and other laws, and the ACA, see SARA 
ROSENBAUM ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM chs. 8, 21 
(2d ed. 2012). 
 24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012) (declaring that states have power to 
regulate and tax the “business of insurance” where Congress has been silent). 
 25. See Sara Rosenbaum, Realigning the Social Order: The Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act and the U.S. Health Insurance System, 7 J. 
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 28 (2011) (“The Affordable Care Act changes 
these federal-state dynamics to a considerable degree. In the private health 
insurance market, the federal presence is much more heavily felt. Although 
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intervention is, of course, what is set to pack such an insurance 
market punch beginning in 2014.26 The Act accomplishes its 
objectives by amending a series of pre-existing—and relatively 
limited—federal regulatory standards added to the Public 
Health Service Act in 1996 by the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA).27 Furthermore, in recognition 
of the imperviousness of self-insured plans to state insurance 
laws, the ACA carries many of its Public Health Service Act 
provisions over to ERISA itself,28 thereby ensuring their 
application to both fully-insured and self-insured ERISA plans. 
Yet even as the ACA introduces powerful structural 
reforms into the legal fabric of insurance regulation, it also 
retains HIPAA’s previous deferential approach to shared 
enforcement responsibilities.29 As has been the case with the 
Congressional approach to insurance regulation since the 
enactment of McCarran-Ferguson,30 the ACA, like its HIPAA 
predecessor, adopts a highly interstitial approach to the 
                                                          
states maintain their primary regulatory function and can maintain both 
Exchange and non-Exchange markets, the Act fundamentally alters the 
federal-state relationship by creating a federal framework for the regulation of 
health insurance.”). 
 26. See Sara Rosenbaum, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: 
Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice, 126 PUB. HEALTH REP. 130, 
130 (2011) (“Full implementation occurs on January 1, 2014, when the 
individual and employer responsibility provisions take effect, state health 
insurance Exchanges begin to operate, the Medicaid expansions take effect, 
and the individual and small-employer group subsidies begin to flow.”). 
 27. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (amending the Public Health Service Act). See 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010) (amending the Public Health Service Act). 
 28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1562(e), 124 Stat. at 270. 
 29. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act sec. 102, 
§ 2722, 110 Stat. at 1968 (“[E]ach State may require that health insurance 
issuers that issue, sell, renew, or offer health insurance coverage in the State 
in the small or large group markets meet the requirement of this part with 
respect to such issuers.”). 
 30. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012); see 
Stephanie Kanwit, The Purchase of Insurance Across State Lines in the 
Individual Market, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 152, 154 (2009) (“The Act had two 
aims: (1) to re-affirm the role of the states as the primary regulators of the 
insurance industry while preserving federal authority to regulate insurance 
through “specific” enactments; and (2) to provide limited federal antitrust 
immunity for the insurance industry.”). 
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exercise of federal powers and maintains states in the 
leadership position.31 
Even a brief recitation of the key ACA reforms makes clear 
that the Act’s substantive intervention into health insurance 
regulation—the quid pro quo for the law’s personal 
responsibility requirement and its attendant penalties32—is so 
sweeping as to fundamentally alter the character of state-
regulated health insurance products. This is especially true in 
the case of products sold in the individual and small-group 
markets, whether inside or outside the new Health Insurance 
Marketplaces.33 The most salient reforms tend to involve access 
to coverage, but the law also contains important modifications 
of coverage design, particularly where individual and small-
group products are concerned.34 The general reforms applicable 
to all markets—large, small, fully-insured, and self-insured—
are as follows: a prohibition of discriminatory health insurance 
rates other than those permissible under a modified community 
rating system;35 guaranteed issuance of coverage36 and renewal 
of policies;37 a ban against discrimination on the basis of health 
                                                          
 31. See Rosenbaum, supra note 25, at 27–28 (“To be sure, ERISA, and to a 
much lesser extent HIPAA, represented major departures from the principles 
embodied in the McCarran Ferguson Act . . . . The Affordable Care Act 
changes these federal-state dynamics to a considerable degree. In the private 
health insurance market, the federal presence is much more heavily felt.”). 
But see Christopher B. Serak, State Challenges to the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act: The Case for A New Federalist Jurisprudence, 9 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 311, 317 (2012) (“The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, while perhaps within the judicial exception to McCarran-Ferguson, will 
eliminate the states’ monopoly over intrastate health insurance transactions 
and severely limit the areas of insurance regulation over which the states 
could still possibly enjoy the protections of McCarran-Ferguson. In effect, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act represents a near-total shift in the 
locus of insurance regulation from the states to the federal government.”). 
 32. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 124 Stat. at     
242–50. 
 33. See, e.g., infra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
 34. Compare infra notes 35–51 and accompanying text, with infra notes 
52–55 and accompanying text. 
 35. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act sec. 1201, § 2701, 124 
Stat. at 155 (amending Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 
682 (1944)). Section 1201 prohibits discrimination based on status as 
individual versus family, geographic area, age, and tobacco use. 
 36. Sec. 1201, § 2702, 124 Stat. at 156. 
 37. Sec. 1201, § 2703, 124 Stat. at 156. 
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status;38 a prohibition on excessive waiting periods;39 coverage 
of routine health costs associated with participation in 
approved clinical trials;40 a ban on annual and lifetime 
coverage limits for most covered services;41 a prohibition on 
rescissions of coverage except in cases of fraud;42 coverage of 
certain recommended preventive health services;43 a 
prohibition against the use of preexisting condition 
exclusions;44 an extension of dependent coverage, when offered, 
to age twenty-six;45 the use of uniform explanation of coverage 
documents and standardized definitions;46 provision of certain 
information to the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) Secretary;47 the use of quality rating systems;48 
establishment of minimum medical-loss ratios and reporting 
requirements for the cost of coverage;49 an expanded appeals 
process including access to external appeals;50 and certain 
patient protections related to emergency care, choice of health 
care professional, and access to pediatric care.51 
In the case of the individual and small-group market, the 
Act goes a major step further by establishing specified coverage 
parameters known as “essential health benefits.”52 These 
“essential health benefits” consist of ten specified coverage 
categories, along with specified cost-sharing and actuarial 
                                                          
 38. § 2705, 124 Stat. at 156–60. An exception is carved-out for wellness 
programs. Id. at 157. 
 39. Waiting periods exceeding ninety days are prohibited. Id. § 2708, 124 
Stat. at 161. 
 40. Sec. 10103, § 2709, 124 Stat. at 892. 
 41. Sec. 1001, § 2711, 124 Stat. at 131. 
 42. Sec. 1001, § 2712, 124 Stat. at 131. 
 43. § 2713, 124 Stat. at 131–32. 
 44. Sec. 1201, § 2704, 124 Stat. at 154–55. 
 45. Sec. 1001, § 2714, 124 Stat. at 132. 
 46. § 2715, 124 Stat. at 132–35. 
 47. Sec. 10101, § 2715A, 124 Stat. at 844. 
 48. Sec. 1001, § 2717, 124 Stat. at 135–36. In a memorable qualifier, 
Congress specified that the national quality rating system to be developed 
must ensure “Protection of Second Amendment Gun Rights” in wellness and 
prevention programs by limiting data collection to exclude information on 
lawful gun ownership or use. Sec. 10101, § 2716(c), 124 Stat. at 884–85. 
 49. Sec. 10101, § 2718, 124 Stat. at 885–87. 
 50. Sec. 1001, § 2719, 124 Stat. at 137–38. 
 51. Sec. 10101, § 2719A, 124 Stat. at 888–91. 
 52. § 1302, 124 Stat. at 163–68. 
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value rules.53 Furthermore, the essential health benefit statute 
contains an unprecedented statutory ban against 
discrimination in the content of coverage on the basis of 
disability54—a breakthrough in the regulation of health 
insurance in the United States, although implemented timidly 
thus far by the Obama Administration.55 
These regulatory reforms are accompanied by the 
establishment of a special Health Insurance Marketplace, 
which combines the equivalent of an online shopping system for 
certain subsets of the overall health insurance market (i.e., 
individual and small group plans)56 with a special regulatory 
environment for overseeing the sale of federally-subsidized 
insurance plans to this part of the market through a system of 
advanced premium tax credits for individuals and tax credits 
for small, low-wage employers.57 At their option, states may 
operate their own Marketplace under broad federal direction 
(known as state-based Marketplaces58) or elect to have the 
                                                          
 53. Id. (“[S]uch benefits shall include at least the following general 
categories . . . : (A) Ambulatory patient services. (B) Emergency services. (C) 
Hospitalization. (D) Maternity and newborn care. (E) Mental health and 
substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment. (F) 
Prescription drugs. (G) Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices. 
(H) Laboratory services. (I) Preventive and wellness services and chronic 
disease management. (J) Pediatric services, including oral and vision care.”). 
 54. § 1302(b)(4)(B), 124 Stat. at 163–68. 
 55. Despite the non-discrimination provision, the Obama Administration’s 
final regulations governing essential health benefits virtually failed to do more 
than simply repeat the language of the statute. For a discussion of the 
weaknesses of the Administration’s implementation efforts in the area of non-
discrimination in coverage, see Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, A Lost 
Opportunity for Persons with Disabilities? The Final Essential Health Benefit 
Rule, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 11, 2013, 10:20 AM), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2013/03/11/a-lost-opportunity-for-persons-with-disabilities-the-final-
essential-health-benefits-rule/. 
 56. See, e.g., What is the Health Insurance Marketplace?, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/what-is-the-health-insurance-
marketplace (last visited Sept. 19, 2013) (providing a lay description of the 
Marketplace). 
 57. The tax credit system is set forth at sections 1401 (individuals) and 
1421 (small businesses) of the Affordable Care Act. 
 58. See State Health Insurance Marketplaces, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-and-
FAQs/state-marketplaces.html (last updated Oct. 1, 2013) (“States across the 
country have received grants to establish a new marketplace. States can 
create and operate their own marketplace (State-based Marketplace) or a 
hybrid called a State Partnership Marketplace in which the state runs certain 
functions. A Partnership Marketplace allows states to make key decisions and 
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federal government operate a “federally-facilitated” 
Marketplace either with or without a “State Partnership.”59 
This conceptual approach to insurance reform—preserving 
state primacy over health insurance regulation while 
introducing transformational federal standards designed to 
fundamentally remake the market at its core60—raises two 
inevitable questions. First, how, exactly, do these 
transformational reforms become integrated into state 
regulatory enforcement machinery, since as noted, state 
primacy is preserved? Second, what if state primacy fails either 
because the state lacks the resources to carry out aggressive 
insurance regulation or elects not to do so? Basic matters of 
constitutional federalism simmer just below the surface of 
these questions. In order to toe the constitutional line and 
avoid a result that might be labeled commandeering,61 
                                                          
tailor the marketplace to local needs and market conditions. The Federal 
government will establish and operate a marketplace in those states that do 
not establish their own.”). 
 59. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of 
Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Exchange Standards for Employers, 
77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,325 (Mar. 27, 2012) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155, 
156, and 157) (“In the Exchange establishment proposed rule, [the HHS] 
introduced the concept of a Partnership model in which HHS and States work 
together on the operation of an Exchange . . . . A Partnership Exchange would 
be a variation of a Federally-facilitated Exchange. Section 1321(c) of the 
Affordable Care Act establishes that if a State does not have an approved 
Exchange, then HHS must establish an Exchange in that State; the statute 
does not authorize divided authority or responsibility. This means that HHS 
would have ultimate responsibility for and authority over the Partnership 
Exchange. In a Partnership Exchange, we intend to provide opportunities for 
a State to help operate the plan management function, some consumer 
assistance functions, or both.”); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.100–.1328 (2012) 
(explaining state options in establishing and managing exchanges). 
 60. See Rosenbaum, supra note 25, at 7–8 (“It is the states that regulate 
the individual and group health insurance markets, and it is the states that 
will be called upon to assure application of federal reforms to insured plans, 
even as the federal government maintains primacy over the self-insured 
market. It is the states that will bear primary responsibility for making 
Exchanges work for individuals and small employers and for guaranteeing 
that adverse selection against Exchanges does not undermine the ability to 
grow insurance products that meet the needs of workers and their families 
without access to employer coverage.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925–33 (1997); see also 
Matthew D. Adler, The Supreme Court’s Federalism: Real or Imagined? State 
Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 158, 158 (2001) (“The anti-commandeering doctrine, recently 
announced by the Supreme Court in New York v. United States and Printz v. 
United States, prohibits the federal government from commandeering state 
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Congress has developed an enforcement approach under which 
the federal government is allowed to tread—but delicately—in 
the face of state nonenforcement.62 The solution may be messy, 
but conceptually it hangs together. To be sure, it probably will 
be sorely tested under the Act’s far more aggressive federal 
standards, but for the time being, the approach is at least 
conceptually workable. 
The ACA’s enforcement system preserves the 1996 HIPAA 
approach, as codified in the Public Health Service Act,63 
although regulations issued in 2012 take a slightly more 
ambitious approach to articulating what could trigger the use 
of federal fallback enforcement powers.64 Under the Public 
Health Service Act approach, states remain the principal 
enforcers, but the federal government positions itself to act if 
all else fails. States have the option, in both the individual and 
group markets, to decide whether they will take the 
enforcement lead or defer to federal authority.65 Should a state 
deliberately elect not to enforce the law, the HHS Secretary is 
                                                          
governments: more specifically, from imposing targeted, affirmative, coercive 
duties upon state legislators or executive officials. This doctrine is best 
understood as an external constraint upon congressional power—analogous to 
the constraints set forth in the Bill of Rights—but one that lacks an explicit 
textual basis.”). 
 62. See infra text accompanying notes 63–87. 
 63. See, e.g., HEALTH POLICY ALTS., INC., SUMMARY OF PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 34 (2010), available at 
http://acscan.org/pdf/healthcare/implementation/PPACA-HPA-summary.pdf 
(“If a state fails to establish an Exchange within 24 months of 
enactment . . . the Secretary is required . . . to establish and operate an 
Exchange within the state and to take actions to implement the other federal 
requirements. Enforces federal authority related to non-electing states 
through the HIPAA enforcement provisions of the PHS Act (newly designated 
§ 2736(b)) without regard to any limitation on the application of those 
provisions to group health plans.”). 
 64. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 155.101–.1328 (2012); see also § 155.105(f) (“If a State 
is not an electing State under § 155.100(a) or an electing State does not have 
an approved or conditionally approved Exchange by January 1, 2013, HHS 
must (directly or through agreement with a not-for-profit entity) establish and 
operate such Exchange within the State.”). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22(a)(1) (Supp. V 2011) (“[E]ach State may require 
that health insurance issuers that issue, sell, renew, or offer health insurance 
coverage in the State in the individual or group market meet the requirements 
of this part with respect to such issuers.”); Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. 
No. 78-410, § 2723(a)(1), 58 Stat. 682 (1944), amended by Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Special 
rules apply to the enforcement of federal laws to nonfederal governmental 
health plans. See Public Health Service Act § 2724; 45 C.F.R. § 146.180 (2012). 
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empowered to step in.66 Furthermore, the law enables the HHS 
Secretary to intervene following a “determination . . . that a 
state has failed to substantially enforce a provision” of federal 
law related to “the issuance, sale, renewal, and offering of 
health insurance coverage in connection with group health 
plans or individual health insurance.”67 In other words, the 
Secretary can intervene in one of two situations. In the first, 
the state empowers intervention by informing her of its 
decision not to enforce the law. In the second, she empowers 
her own intervention by “determining” its necessity. This 
mutuality of empowerment represents a complicated but 
conceptually brilliant resolution to the constitutional problem 
of federalism. Equality and deference are maintained. Yet the 
law also allows for careful intervention. 
Just how carefully the intervention has to proceed becomes 
clearer the more the regulations are scrutinized. As noted, the 
regulations provide for federal action in situations in which “a 
State notifies [the federal government] that it has not enacted 
legislation to enforce or that it is not otherwise enforcing” 
federal market requirements.68 But the post-ACA regulations 
enable federal intervention under certain triggering 
circumstances, which range from the existence of a complaint 
filed with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS),69 which has jurisdiction over the health insurance 
market reforms,70 to news media reports71 and “any other 
information” that suggests nonenforcement.72 Notably, the rule, 
like the statute, contemplates no independent and affirmative 
federal oversight system; that is, the federal government 
expects to sit passively until some third party brings 
                                                          
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22(a)(2); Public Health Service Act § 2723(a)(2). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22(a)(2); Public Health Service Act § 2723(a)(2). 
The Public Health Service Act also lays out the Secretary’s enforcement 
authority as well as a federal enforcement process, which involves the 
imposition of civil money penalties, as well as an extensive process of review 
for determining liability. Id. § 2723(b). The authority to act on the issuer’s 
license remains solely a matter for a state. Cf. GARY CLAXTON, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND., HOW PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE WORKS: A PRIMER 7–8 (2002), 
available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/how-
private-insurance-works-a-primer-report.pdf. 
 68. 45 C.F.R. § 150.203(a) (2012). 
 69. Id. § 150.205(a). 
 70. See id. § 150.101. 
 71. § 150.205(c). 
 72. § 150.205(f). 
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nonenforcement to its attention.73 But at the point at which 
evidence is received, the intervention machinery can begin to 
work. 
The process spelled out in the rule, even as revised post-
ACA, remains almost painfully deferential to state powers. Not 
only does the rule commit the federal government to wait for 
third-party news of enforcement failure, but furthermore, the 
federal intervention process begins with an assessment of 
“whether the affected individual or entity has made reasonable 
efforts to exhaust available State remedies.”74 In other words, 
even when evidence of nonenforcement surfaces, the 
regulations throw the matter back into the very state system 
whose alleged failure is the subject of the third-party evidence. 
Following this effort to accommodate a nonenforcing state, 
the regulations spell out a lengthy consultative process as part 
of complaint resolution,75 with an eye toward nudging a state 
into action rather than immediately launching federal-
enforcement activities (which involve a lengthy investigation 
and review process, followed by the imposition of civil money 
penalties in cases in which liability is established76).77 The 
delicate nature of the federal intervention underscores the 
degree to which the federal government has sought to create an 
environment in which CMS will step in only in the most 
sustained and egregious situations—only after it determines 
that a total breakdown in state enforcement truly has occurred. 
And even then, it does so with an eye toward ultimately 
negotiating a resolution that brings enforcement squarely back 
under state control. 
In keeping with this tentative and circumspect approach to 
federal enforcement, CMS has gone to remarkable lengths to 
hide even this carefully circumscribed machinery from public 
view. Unlike the federal privacy rule, where HHS has taken a 
                                                          
 73. See generally id. §§ 150.203–.205. 
 74. Id. §150.209. 
 75. The process involves notice to multiple state officials, thirty days for 
an initial response by the state with the option to extend the response time, a 
preliminary determination with more time granted to the state to show 
substantial enforcement, and ultimately a final determination regarding 
CMS’s intention to intervene in the enforcement process. Id. §§ 150.211–.221. 
 76. Id. §§ 150.301–.347. 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22 (Supp. V 2011); Public Health Service Act, Pub. 
L. No. 78-410, § 2723, 58 Stat. 682 (1944), amended by Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
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relatively aggressive approach to publicizing its efforts to be 
the leader in privacy protection,78 the tradition of insurance 
regulation is tilted so strongly in the direction of the states79 
that it is essentially impossible to find the entry point into the 
federal default system. If one peruses the website of the Center 
for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight (CCIIO),80 
the insurance regulation arm of CMS, the site offers virtually 
no information on how to file a complaint or bring potential 
nonenforcement violations to federal attention. Instead, the 
CCIIO website offers a lengthy explanation—simultaneously 
legally meaningless and politically significant—about CCIIO’s 
partnership with the states.81 The site does notify the public 
about states that have formally notified CCIIO that they do not 
intend to enforce the market reforms.82 But even in this 
extreme situation, the agency does little to explain what the 
federal government will do other than notify issuers that policy 
forms must be sent to CMS for inspection and review. If a form 
is found to depart from federal standards, “CMS will notify 
issuers of any concerns . . . . and will also conduct targeted 
market conduct examinations, as necessary, and respond to 
consumer inquiries and complaints . . . .”83 If problems are 
uncovered, CMS notes that it will “work cooperatively” with the 
                                                          
 78. See Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, Enforcement and Penalties 
for Noncompliance, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/summary/index.html 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013). 
 79. See Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good 
Intentions: Problems and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance 
Under ERISA, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 29, 32–37 (1999). 
 80. Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Compliance, CENTERS FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, http://www.cms.gov/cciio/programs-and-
initiatives/health-insurance-market-reforms/compliance.html (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Compliance]. 
 81. Id. (“States and CMS have worked closely to ensure compliance with 
the health insurance accountability and consumer protections in federal law. 
The vast majority of states are enforcing the Affordable Care Act health 
insurance market reforms. Some states lack the authority, the ability to 
enforce these provisions, or both. CMS has responsibility for enforcing these 
requirements in a state that is not enforcing the health insurance market 
reforms either through a collaborative arrangement with the state or by direct 
enforcement to ensure all residents of the state receive the protections of the 
Affordable Care Act.”). 
 82. As of the end of March 2013, six states had done so: Arizona, 
Alabama, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wyoming. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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state (the same state that notified CMS that it would not 
enforce the law) to “ensure compliance.”84 CMS does not 
explain how compliance will be ensured in a situation in which 
a state, already having indicated that it will not enforce its 
licensure laws in relation to federal standards, will somehow be 
galvanized into action. Despite all of these limitations, it is 
clear that should push come to shove, the federal government is 
prepared to enforce the law if states fail to do so. As tentative 
as the process might be, the fallback system erases any doubt 
that the market reforms are nationwide in scope and leaves no 
room for a state to opt-out of the reforms themselves, even if it 
elects not to enforce the law or utterly fails to do so.85 The 
presence of the federal fallback process also undoubtedly plays 
at least some role in keeping the number of nonenforcing states 
to a relative minimum. With the exception of the new Health 
Insurance Marketplaces, where there may be many good 
reasons to bring in the feds,86 most states place a high value on 
their primacy in regulation of the insurance market.87 The 
HIPAA federal fallback remedy, updated for the post-ACA legal 
environment, creates a framework of national assurance. 
                                                          
 84. Id. 
 85. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
 86. A number of states undoubtedly have opted not to run their own 
Marketplaces, at least in the initial implementation period, not because they 
intend to sink the law, but because setting up the new online system is so 
complex that they would prefer to have the federal government run it, at least 
early on. Cf. Tracking the Progress of the Health Exchanges, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/10/04/us/opening-week-of-health-
exchanges.html?ref=health (last updated Oct. 26, 2013) (“Many of the 
Affordable Care Act’s health exchanges have struggled with technological 
problems since they opened on Oct. 1, though a few state-run exchanges have 
fared better than others.”). I would assume that ten years from now, states 
either will be running their Marketplaces or will be full partners with the 
federal government. 
 87. Cf. Rosenbaum, supra note 25, at 27 (“Congress enacted the McCarran 
Ferguson Act to clarify the states’ primacy where regulation of insurance is 
concerned. To be sure, ERISA, and to a much lesser extent HIPAA, 
represented major departures from the principles embodied in the McCarran 
Ferguson Act. ERISA shields all health plans from major bodies of state law. 
At the same time, states retain enormous discretion over the design and 
performance of health insurance products sold in the individual and group 
health markets.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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III. THE ENDANGERED FEDERAL-STATE MEDICAID 
RELATIONSHIP 
At enactment, the ACA’s Medicaid provisions were on 
track to add coverage by 2019 for an additional sixteen 
million88 people beyond the sixty-five million already enrolled 
in the program at the time of passage.89 Three years later, the 
CBO had officially scaled back expectations to thirteen million 
newly enrolled persons by 2023, a loss of some three million 
persons.90 Even with these declining numbers, however, 
coverage for millions of poor citizens hangs in the balance,91 as 
the Court’s Medicaid ruling in NFIB has imperiled the future of 
one of the principal legs of the four-legged stool—Medicaid, 
Medicare, employer-sponsored coverage, and the revamped 
individual insurance market—on which the post-reform 
coverage system rests. 
                                                          
 88. Leighton Ku, Explaining Recent Changes in CBO Projections of Health 
Insurance Coverage and Costs Under the Affordable Care Act, 
HEALTHREFORMGPS (June 5, 2013), http://healthreformgps.org/resources/
explaining-recent-changes-in-cbo-projections-of-health-insurance-coverage-
and-costs-under-the-affordable-care-act./. 
 89. MACSTATS: MEDICAID AND CHIP PROGRAM STATISTICS, MEDICAID & 
CHIP PAYMENT & ACCESS COMMISSION 6 tbl.2 (2013), https://docs.google.com/
viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=bWFjcGFjLmdvdnxtYWNwYWN8Z3g6NGQ5N
DI1NTliNTkwNzgzNg (showing Medicaid enrollment of over sixty-five million 
in fiscal year 2010). 
 90. Jessica Banthin & Sarah Masi, CBO’s Estimate of the Net Budgetary 
Impact of the Affordable Care Act’s Health Insurance Coverage Provisions Has 
Not Changed Much Over Time, CONG. BUDGET OFF. (May 14, 2013), 
http://www.cbo.gov/publication/44176. The reasons for this scaled back impact 
assessment are multiple and go beyond the legal free-fall created by the 
Court’s Medicaid decision. For a clear explanation of the factors that have 
caused the budgeting arm of Congress to change its estimates over time, see 
Ku, supra note 88. 
 91. Recently-arrived legal U.S. residents who are not yet eligible for 
Medicaid (which imposes a five-year waiting period for adults and an optional 
waiting period for children) can go immediately into the Marketplace, even if 
their family incomes are well below its 100% subsidy threshold. Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1401(a), 124 Stat. 
119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (amending IRC to include                 
§ 36B(c)(1)(B)). Thus, states that refuse to expand Medicaid punish only U.S. 
citizens and long-term legal residents. As with the other arguments outlined 
below, the argument of equity for U.S. citizens has fallen generally on deaf 
ears in the resister states, but was highly persuasive in the case of the 
Governors of Arizona and New Mexico, both of which have very large 
immigrant populations. 
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The 2014 adult-expansion group began, of course, as a 
mandatory coverage group.92 Technically speaking, the group 
remains mandatory, since in the majority opinion, the Chief 
Justice was clear that nothing in its holding touched the 
underlying terms of the expansion, but instead was limited to 
the Secretary’s power to enforce those terms against states’ 
existing Medicaid programs.93 What is left is a coverage group 
that remains technically mandatory but from which states can 
opt out without fear of federal reprisal (other than the loss of 
the funding that would have come with the expansion).94 But 
rather than easing tensions, the decision has only made a bad 
federal-state Medicaid relationship worse,95 transforming 
defeat of the expansion into a clarion call for opponents of the 
law. 
Figure 1, which depicts state decisions related to the 
Medicaid expansion and implementation of state Exchanges, 
shows the state of affairs as of November 2013.96 The twenty-
four states that had rejected the expansion as of this date could 
fairly be characterized as the usual suspects: “red states” that 
                                                          
 92. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001, amending Social 
Security Act § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i). 
 93. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 
(2012) (“Nothing in our opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under 
the Affordable Care Act to expand the availability of health care, and 
requiring that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their 
use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to 
participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid 
funding.”). For a full discussion of the decision, see Bagenstos, supra note 20; 
Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and 
Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. 
L. REV. 1 (2013); Sara Rosenbaum & Timothy M. Westmoreland, The Supreme 
Court’s Surprising Decision on the Medicaid Expansion: How Will the Federal 
Government and States Proceed?, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1663 (2012). 
 94. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (“What Congress is not free to do is to 
penalize States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking 
away their existing Medicaid funding. Section 1396c gives the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services the authority to do just that . . . . [T]he Secretary 
cannot apply § 1396c to withdraw existing Medicaid funds for failure to 
comply with the requirements set out in the expansion.”). 
 95. Lest people think that the Medicaid battle that engulfed the ACA is 
some sort of anomaly, they need only read ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY 
STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID 
(1974), or the more recent account of Medicaid’s tumultuous history in DAVID 
G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY: 1965–2007 
(2008). The fight is always the same: money, state autonomy, and federal 
power. 
 96. See infra note 103. 
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served as the plaintiffs in the original Medicaid challenge to 
the Act97 and whose political leaders (most,98 not necessarily 
all) remain fully committed to total disruption of the law. Not 
only are these states home to the majority of uninsured people 
in the United States,99 but they also tend to be the states whose 
populations are the most heavily disadvantaged in terms of 
poverty and health status in the country.100 As the figure 
shows, the rejecter states tend to be located in the Deep South 
(or contiguous with it) and are home to enormous 
concentrations of low income (and disproportionately minority) 
residents who suffer the worst population health profiles in the 
nation,101 including health conditions considered highly 
amenable to proper medical care.102 
                                                          
 97. See States’ Positions in the Affordable Care Act Case at the Supreme 
Court, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-
positions-on-aca-case/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2013) (“On March 23, 2010, the 
state of Florida filed a lawsuit in federal district court challenging the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion 
included in the Affordable Care Act. Florida was joined by 25 other 
states . . . .”). 
 98. For example, after leading the charge against the Medicaid expansion, 
Governor Rick Scott of Florida championed its adoption. He was bested by his 
Republican legislature, which ignored his pleas and those of scores of 
employer, health care, civic, and other organizations. See Sarah Kliff, Florida 
Rejects Medicaid Expansion, Leaves 1 Million Uninsured, WASH. POST 
WONKBLOG (May 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/05/05/florida-rejects-medicaid-expansion-leaves-1-3-million-
uninsured/ (“Scott wouldn’t be the one to ‘deny Floridians’ a part of the health 
care law—but the Florida legislature had other plans.”); see also Pear, supra 
note 21 (“Several Republican governors, like Rick Scott in Florida, wanted to 
expand Medicaid, but met resistance from state legislators.”). 
 99. Pear, supra note 21 (“More than half of all people without health 
insurance live in states that are not planning to expand Medicaid.”). 
 100. See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. 
 101. See, e.g., Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Health 
Disparities and Inequality Report—United States, 2011, 60 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 7 fig.4 (Supp. Jan. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6001.pdf (showing the “Gini Index” of 
inequality in number of healthy days and average number of healthy days, by 
state). Deep South states that have announced their rejection of the Medicaid 
expansion or are leaning in that direction account for five of the bottom ten 
ranked states. Other states leaning toward rejection of Medicaid expansion, 
shown in Figure 1, make up most of the other bottom ten Gini states, with the 
exception of Kentucky and West Virginia. Health problems in the South are so 
serious that the region is identified in its entirety as a key focus of needed 
progress. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT 2011, 
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Figure 1103 
 
For fifty years, as fraught as the federal-state Medicaid 
relationship has been, it has somehow hung together. Indeed, 
during periods of threat, such as proposals to block grant 
Medicaid, states of all political stripes have tended to band 
together with Medicaid’s federal supporters in order to stave-off 
the imposition of arbitrary aggregate limits on federal Medicaid 
                                                          
at 2 (2012), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/findings/nhqrdr/
nhdr11/nhdr11.pdf. 
 102. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 101, at 1; see, 
e.g., Medicaid Program: Initial Core Set of Health Care Quality Measures for 
Medicaid-Eligible Adults, 77 Fed. Reg. 286 (Jan. 4, 2012). Pursuant to the 
Affordable Care Act, the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services has identified a “core set” of adult clinical quality measures that 
emphasize treatments and interventions that can appropriately manage 
serious and chronic health conditions in adults. 
 103. This map was created using a template found at Re: USA Interactive 
Map Application, ANDYPOPE.INFO, http://www.andypope.info/ngs/ng12.htm 
(last updated Apr. 28, 2007), and using data from State Decisions on Health 
Insurance Marketplaces and the Medicaid Expansion, as of November 
22, 2013, KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/
state-decisions-for-creating-health-insurance-exchanges-and-expanding-
medicaid/ (last updated Nov. 22, 2013). 
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payments,104 even in cases in which states have been promised 
the elimination of federal requirements in exchange for a cap 
on payment.105 
But the 2014 adult expansion turned out to be different, for 
reasons that no one close to the process completely 
understands. It would be easy to ascribe this latest round in 
Medicaid wars to the uniquely terrible political situation in 
which the nation finds itself engulfed. It is the case that, over 
decades of Medicaid expansions, many of the program’s most 
important champions have been federal and state Republican 
leaders.106 Indeed, during the halcyon period of Democratic-
Republic cooperation in the early days of the ACA’s 
development, staff on both sides considered setting Medicaid 
coverage standards as high as twice the federal poverty level.107 
This position was abandoned not because of the states, but 
primarily because insurers themselves, who had insisted on 
retaining a segmented Medicaid population for risk-avoidance 
reasons, simultaneously objected to losing out on the just-
                                                          
 104. See, e.g., Bruce Lesley, Medicaid Block Grants: A Zombie Idea With 
Lipstick in Texas, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9, 2013, 5:06 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-lesley/medicaid-block-grants-
texas_b_3044635.html (“Federal block grants are, by definition, an arbitrarily 
capped amount of federal funding that go to states in the form of a lump sum 
payment and fail to adjust for population growth, economic changes, public 
health crises, or natural disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, etc.”). 
 105. States are wise, of course. Medicaid is the single largest source of 
federal funding received by states. See VICTORIA WACHINO ET AL., HENRY J. 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FINANCING THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: THE MANY 
ROLES OF FEDERAL AND STATE MATCHING FUNDS, at i (2004). As the Chief 
Justice noted in NFIB, states are enormously dependent on its funding. While 
state lawmakers always would appreciate solid funding with fewer 
requirements, most realize that it is the very structure of the program that 
justifies the financing arrangement. For a particularly insightful discussion of 
this stressed and yet mutually beneficial relationship, see Alan Weil, There’s 
Something About Medicaid, 22 HEALTH AFF. 13 (2003). 
 106. See DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE, MEDICAID POLITICS AND 
POLICY, 1965–2007, at 170–71 (2008) (explaining that the reforms enacted 
throughout the 1980s, which eventually added coverage of all low-income, 
pregnant women and children under eighteen years, were the product of 
consistent and political collaborations among Democrats in the House (chiefly 
Henry Waxman and John Dingell), Senate Republicans (in particular, 
Senators Durenberger and Chafee), and two Republican Presidents (Bush and 
Reagan). However, even fine histories of the era, such as the cited book, do not 
capture the extent of the collaboration. 
 107. See infra note 108. 
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above-poverty market.108 Given the history of federal-state 
relationships with years of grudging accommodation, the large 
number of states eager to remove Medicaid’s historic exclusion 
of most poor adults,109 and the highly favorable federal 
contribution levels, which begin at 100% federal funding in 
2014 and decline to 90% in 2020 and thereafter,110 people 
basically assumed that the states would come around. 
In the end, the catastrophe surrounding the Medicaid 
expansion probably was the result of a combination of factors: 
the viciousness of the political environment in which 
everything can be sacrificed for the sake of scoring points; a 
persistent and deep bias against aiding poor, uninsured adults 
(it is not uncommon to find even the most sophisticated 
reporters referring to the 2014 adult expansion group as “able-
bodied,” a dog-whistle term, of course, for the undeserving 
welfare poor);111 and conveniently, a legal theory—coercion—
whose very existence was in doubt in the minds of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit112 but that 
seems to so aptly sum up the poisonous environment in which 
the ACA is unfolding. In the end, the coercion doctrine 
effectively emerged as the weapon of choice for releasing 
decades of anger about Medicaid requirements and costs, long-
standing prejudice against the poor, and capturing in a court of 
law the extraordinary politics surrounding the Act and its 
implementation.113 
                                                          
 108. These observations are a result of my direct involvement in the 
legislative discussions that led to the Act. 
 109. See, e.g., SAMANTHA ARTIGA, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE 
UNINSURED, THE ROLE OF SECTION 1115 WAIVERS IN MEDICAID AND CHIP: 
LOOKING FORWARD AND LOOKING BACK 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/provgovpart/Documents/Waiver%20Renewal/The%20R
ole%20of%20Section%201118%20Waivers_Mar2009.pdf (discussing different 
demonstration waiver programs under Medicaid). For example, the George W. 
Bush Administration established Health Insurance Flexibility and 
Accountability (HIFA) waivers, special demonstration programs under section 
1115 of the Social Security Act, which permitted states to expand coverage to 
impoverished, but otherwise ineligible, low-income adults. See id. at 6–9. 
 110. See About Medicaid, FAMILIESUSA, http://www.familiesusa.org/issues/
medicaid/about-medicaid.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2013). 
 111. Pear, supra note 21, at A1. 
 112. See Florida ex. rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1265–67 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing the court’s 
skepticism of the doctrine of coercion). 
 113. Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, supra note 93, at 1671. 
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Whatever its causes, NFIB set off a year-long desperate 
effort to convince the very states that sued to block the law’s 
implementation to make a 180-degree turn and accept the 
expansion.114 This odyssey, which will unfold in 2013 and 
beyond, actually began with a preliminary skirmish in which 
the states that had sued to block the expansion attempted to 
stake out new ground that went beyond the decision itself.115 In 
trying to position themselves on this new ground, the states 
argued that the Supreme Court actually had altered the terms 
of the expansion statute itself, creating a series of state options 
where previously there had been only a single coverage group 
tied to enhanced funding.116 
Eager for the federal funds, states argued that the impact 
of the decision was to create a partial implementation option 
(e.g., coverage up to 100% of the federal poverty level, or 50% or 
whatever percentage a state might choose) at highly favorable 
federal financial participation rates.117 That the states’ position 
was erroneous was clear from the plain terms of the decision.118 
But even had the law been sufficiently ambiguous to afford the 
Secretary some running room to offer a more expansive 
interpretation of its meaning, there was widespread skepticism 
over whether allowing states to select the expansion point of 
their choice would have done any good as a practical matter.119 
States that selected less than all the people in the Medicaid 
expansion group—persons with family incomes up to 138% of 
the federal poverty level—might have chosen to cap Medicaid 
at 100% of poverty, the point at which the Marketplace 
subsidies actually begin.120 But once state flexibility was 
                                                          
 114. Id. at 1668–71. 
 115. Id. at 1667–70. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 1669–70. 
 118. Id. at 1668–70 (discussing the decision and the Court’s explanation of 
what it was and was not doing in relation to the Medicaid statute itself). 
 119. See, e.g., Pear, supra note 21, at A1. 
 120. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). The fact that the subsidies can commence at 
100% of poverty does not alter the fact that Medicaid eligibility, under §1401, 
bars the receipt of subsidies. See also Sara Rosenbaum, Update: The IRS’ 
Final Shared Responsibility Regulations: When Does Medicaid Eligibility 
Amount to “Minimum Essential Coverage”?, HEALTHREFORMGPS (Sept. 4, 
2013), http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/update-the-irs-final-shared-
responsibility-regulations-when-does-medicaid-eligibility-amount-to-
minimum-essential-coverage/ (discussing the fact that because the subsidies 
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granted, there would be no legally logical stopping point, and it 
was anything but clear that any more states would agree to 
coverage up to 100% of poverty.121 This speculation about what 
might or might not happen were the Secretary to allow states 
to exercise coverage flexibility within the 2014 expansion group 
did not matter in any event, because the Court could not have 
been clearer: its decision did not alter the terms of the 
expansion population, and therefore could not have given the 
Secretary the authority to rewrite the legislation.122 It merely 
barred the Secretary’s power to withhold current funding from 
states that refused to adopt it.123 
With the prospect of partial expansion officially off the 
table as the result of Administration policies released in 
2012,124 state legislatures returned in 2013 to an absolutely 
extraordinary atmosphere in which the all-or-nothing question 
of Medicaid expansion was debated in dozens of states.125 
Legislative sessions in many resister states faced enormous 
efforts by large stakeholder coalitions in support of 
                                                          
can commence at 100% of poverty does not alter the fact that Medicaid 
eligibility bars the receipt of subsidies). The ineligibility of persons with other 
forms of coverage to qualify for premium subsidies represents an attempt on 
Congress’s part to ensure that persons with other forms of coverage would 
drop their coverage in order to purchase direct coverage through the 
exchanges instead. 
 121. Rosenbaum & Westmoreland, supra note 93, at 1669. 
 122. See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2607 (2012) (“This is not to say, as the joint dissent suggests, that we are 
‘rewriting the Medicaid Expansion.’ Instead, we determine, first, that § 1396c 
is unconstitutional when applied to withdraw existing Medicaid funds from 
States that decline to comply with the expansion. We then follow Congress’s 
explicit textual instruction to leave unaffected ‘the remainder of the chapter, 
and the application of [the challenged] provision to other persons or 
circumstances.’” (internal citations omitted)). 
 123. Id. 
 124. The Secretary quietly announced her decision in a set of “frequently 
asked questions” (#26) issued December 10, 2012. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS ON EXCHANGES, MARKET REFORMS AND MEDICAID 11 (2012) 
[hereinafter FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS], available at 
http://www.tota.org/Files/CMS_FAQ.pdf. 
 125. See, e.g., State Legislatures Debate Medicaid Expansion, PATIENT 
PROTECTION & AFFORDABLE CARE ACT STATE ACTION NEWSL. (Nat’l 
Conference of State Legislatures, Denver, Colo.), Feb. 8, 2013, at 1. Debates 
are ongoing as of Fall 2013. Several States Still Facing Debates About 
Medicaid Expansion, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Daily-Reports/2013/September/12/medicaid-
expansion-issues.aspx. 
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expansion126: the health care industry (especially hospitals that 
treat large numbers of low-income patients and stand to lose 
tens of billions of dollars in the coming decade in federal 
Medicare and Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) 
payments);127 churches and religious organizations;128 
consumer advocates and voluntary organizations;129 and most 
notably, perhaps, employers130—particularly, low-wage 
                                                          
 126. See, e.g., Elizabeth Crisp, Push for Medicaid Expansion Continues 
Beyond Session, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 10, 2013), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/article_e17f5e9e-8b5d-
5b63-8868-ee10ec8ccada.html#.UbXz1GKGK34.twitter; Mike Dennison, 
Coalition Plans Voter Initiative to Expand Montana Medicaid Coverage, 
MISSOULIAN (June 26, 2013, 10:35 AM), http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-
regional/coalition-plans-voter-initiative-to-expand-montana-medicaid-
coverage/article_c1aa0dd2-de7d-11e2-8a68-0019bb2963f4.html; Mary Ellen 
Klas, Big Business Coalitions: Failure to Expand Medicaid Hurts Business, 
MIAMI HERALD BLOG (June 19, 2013, 5:06 PM), 
http://miamiherald.typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2013/06/big-business-coalitions-
failure-to-expand-medicaid-hurts-business.html. 
 127. Medicaid Program, State Disproportionate Share Hospital Allotment 
Reductions, 78 Fed. Reg. 28,551, 28,552 (proposed May 15, 2013) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(F) (2006 & 
Supp. V 2011). The DSH cuts are considerable and are slated to take effect 
despite the fact that many states will not have expanded Medicaid; the cuts 
were, of course, predicated on the expansion. Corey Davis, Q and A: 
Disproportionate Share Hospital Payments and the Medicaid Expansion, 
NAT’L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, 6 (July 2012), http://www.apha.org/NR/
rdonlyres/328D24F3-9C75-4CC5-9494-7F1532EE828A/0/NHELP_DSH_
QA_final.pdf. In the spring of 2013, the Administration attempted to mitigate 
these effects somewhat in proposed regulations. Medicaid Program; State 
Disproportionate Share Hospital Allotment Reductions, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
28,566; Medicare Program, 78 Fed. Reg. 27,486, 27,504–05 (proposed May 10, 
2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 482, 485, and 489). Whatever 
softening might be feasible within the confines of the legislative formulas to be 
applied, it is obvious that the loss of DSH funding will prove especially 
harmful to hospitals treating large numbers of low-income persons in states 
that do not expand Medicaid. See Davis, supra note 127, at 6. Together, the 
two reductions are expected to result in more than $36 billion in losses to 
these hospitals between 2010 and 2019, and because the reductions are 
permanent, the losses will continue indefinitely. Id. (providing a helpful 
overview of the two DSH programs and the potential impact of the cuts). 
 128. See, e.g., JoAnne Viviano, Religious Groups Push for Kasich’s 
Medicaid Expansion, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 4, 2013, 10:31 AM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/03/04/religious-groups-
push-for-kasichs-medicaid-expansion.html. 
 129. See, e.g., About the Alliance, OHIO ALLIANCE HEALTH 
TRANSFORMATION, http://ohiomedicaidalliance.org/about_the_alliance (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2013). 
 130. See, e.g., Scott Powers, Business Groups Say Expanding Medicaid 
Would Save Them Money, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 19, 2013, 
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employers unable to afford health plans for their employees 
whose workers would qualify for Medicaid coverage.131 The only 
force arrayed on the other side of this fight virtually 
everywhere it was being waged was ideology. 
That the expansion arguments have been so one-sided is 
inevitable in light of the utter absence of any factual basis for 
turning it down. Indeed, the evidence in favor of the expansion 
is overwhelming.132 Moreover, that state resistance was not 
based in fact becomes clear from even a cursory perusal of the 
materials used in the legislative sessions. Even a cursory 
review of studies from leading research organizations such as 
the Urban Institute and the Rand Corporation, as well as state-
specific studies gauging the economic impact of expansion, 
illustrates the overwhelming consensus among researchers 
regarding the bottom-line economic gains to states flowing from 
the Medicaid expansion, as well as the significant losses that 
states can be expected to experience as a result of not 
expanding.133 
                                                          
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2013-06-19/news/os-business-pushes-
medicaid-expansion-20130619_1_medicaid-expansion-expansion-plan-charity-
care. 
 131. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 253 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (amending the 
IRC to include a “shared responsibility for employers” section, also known as 
“play or pay”). Larger employers that do not offer coverage face tax penalties if 
their workers purchase subsidized coverage through the Marketplace, but 
they face no similar penalty if their workers enroll in Medicaid. Id. The 
“shared responsibility” provision will take effect on January 1, 2015. See 
Shared Responsibility Requirements, HEALTHCOVERAGEGUIDE.ORG, 
http://healthcoverageguide.org/affordable-care-act/shared-responsibility-
requirements/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2013). 
 132. See, e.g., Medicaid Expansion Center, FAMILIESUSA, 
http://www.familiesusa.org/issues/medicaid/expansion-center/ (under “Tools to 
Make the Case for State Expansion”) (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
 133. See, e.g., JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE COST OF 
NOT EXPANDING MEDICAID (2013), available at http://kff.org/medicaid/
report/the-cost-of-not-expanding-medicaid/; Carter C. Price & Christine 
Eibner, For States That Opt out of Medicaid Expansion: 3.6 Million Fewer 
Insured and $8.4 Billion Less in Federal Payments, HEALTH AFF., June 2013, 
at 1030; Carter C. Price, Quick Takes: The Math of Medicaid Expansion, 
RAND CORP. (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/10/quick-takes-
the-math-of-medicaid-expansion.html. Various cost impact studies of the 
decision to opt out of the Medicaid expansion, a wealth of studies of the 
various economic benefits of expansion, and state-specific studies on the 
economic effects of the expansion can be found in a special website maintained 
by Families USA. Medicaid Expansion Center, FAMILIESUSA, 
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These national studies, as well as the array of specially 
commissioned reports on the economic impact of the Medicaid 
expansion that have been prepared for specific states,134 
document the economic effects of expansion, ranging from its 
infusion of tens of billions of dollars in revenue into struggling 
state and local economies135 to the assistance that expansion 
would provide to struggling small low-wage employers136 and 
the property and other tax relief it would provide to strapped 
local economies bending under the weight of indigent health 
care costs.137 
With respect to the Medicaid expansion economic impact 
analyses, no study has been more important than a special 
analysis conducted by John Holahan and colleagues in fall 2012 
for the Kaiser Family Foundation,138 whose central finding is 
captured in Figure 2, below.139 This analysis demonstrates that 
if all states were to collectively reject the Medicaid expansion, 
they would spend $8 billion less over the 2013–2022 time-
period than would be spent collectively were all states to adopt 
the expansion.140 This conclusion rests on several factors: the 
heavily enhanced federal funding; the effects of the expansion 
                                                          
http://www.familiesusa.org/issues/medicaid/expansion-center/ (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2013). 
 134. These reports and studies can be reviewed at a special website 
maintained by Families USA, under “Tools to Make the Case for a State 
Expansion,” Medicaid Expansion Center, FAMILIESUSA, http://
www.familiesusa.org/issues/medicaid/expansion-center/ (last visited Sept. 13, 
2013), and study collections by state can be viewed under “Resources from the 
States, Medicaid Expansion Center, Resources from the States, FAMILIESUSA, 
http://www.familiesusa.org/issues/medicaid/expansion-center/resources-from-
the-states.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
 135. See, e.g., Medicaid Expansion, COVER GA., available at 
http://healthyfuturega.org/pdfs/MedicaidPostcard_r4_web.pdf (last visited Oct. 
5, 2013). 
 136. See, e.g., Steve Spires, Medicaid Expansion: An Opportunity to Invest 
in Louisiana’s Workforce, LA. BUDGET PROJECT 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.labudget.org/lbp/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Medicaid-expansion-
an-opportunity-to-invest.pdf?b467e680. 
 137. See, e.g., Andrea Kovach, Expanding Medicaid: The Choice is Clear, 
SHRIVER BRIEF (July 10, 2012), http://www.theshriverbrief.org/2012/07/
articles/health-care-justice/expanding-medicaid-the-choice-is-clear/. 
 138. JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE 
UNINSURED, THE COST AND COVERAGE IMPLICATIONS OF THE ACA MEDICAID 
EXPANSION: NATIONAL AND STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS 5 (2012), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8384.pdf. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1. 
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on state revenues as funds flow into the economy and jobs; and 
the expansion’s ability to offset, through insurance, previous 
state and local expenditures on medically indigent care.141 
 
Figure 2 
 
There is, of course, no longer any basis for claiming that 
health insurance does not matter. A virtual deluge of studies, 
many captured in the briefs filed with the Court in NFIB, 
documents that the uninsured have more limited access to care 
and that being uninsured compromises health and life.142 Nor 
is there any lingering dispute over the economic impact of the 
uninsured on the health care system and those with 
insurance.143 While the existence of enormous cost-shifting 
across health care markets did not create a basis for regulating 
individual conduct in the health insurance market according to 
                                                          
 141. Id. at 5–7. 
 142. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2611–12 
(2012). 
 143. Id. 
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the NFIB majority,144 Congress considered its existence a 
factual given, along with other evidence showing the economic 
impact of the failure to extend insurance coverage to all 
Americans.145 
Neither is there any debate over the value of Medicaid, 
despite the best efforts of its opponents to attack the program. 
Medicaid is accused of being costly and ineffective in improving 
health and health care.146 In fact, the program owes its size not 
to excessive spending on the poor, but instead to the sheer 
number of people it must insure and the costly nature of the 
services it covers.147 As an insurer, Medicaid is a bargain, with 
a price tag one third lower on an average annual per capita 
basis than the same level of private insurance coverage, chiefly 
because its provider payment rates are so low.148 Furthermore, 
despite claims to the contrary, which themselves rest on flawed 
research that fails to control for the health characteristics of 
Medicaid beneficiaries or the point at which they are enrolled 
in the program,149 a cascade of studies points in the direction of 
                                                          
 144. Id. at 2590–93. 
 145. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 1501(a)(2), 124 Stat. 119, 242 (2010), amended by Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 
(“Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health Service Act (as amended 
by section 1201 of this Act), if there were no requirement, many individuals 
would wait to purchase health insurance until they needed care. By 
significantly increasing health insurance coverage, the requirement, together 
with the other provisions of this Act, will minimize this adverse selection and 
broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which 
will lower health insurance premiums.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Weil, supra note 106, at 15. 
 147. John Holahan & Stacey McMorrow, Medicare and Medicaid Spending 
Trends and the Deficit Debate, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 393, 394–95 (2012) 
(explaining why Medicaid costs so much). 
 148. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, EXPANDING MEDICAID A 
LESS COSTLY WAY TO COVER MORE LOW-INCOME UNINSURED THAN 
EXPANDING PRIVATE INSURANCE 3 (June 26, 2008), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-26-08health.pdf (“Average medical costs paid by an 
insurer on behalf of an adult Medicaid beneficiary would be 7 
percent . . . greater on average, if the beneficiary were covered instead by 
private insurance.”); CBO ESTIMATES, supra note 8, at 4–5 (showing that the 
per capita difference between Medicaid and private premiums is $6000 versus 
$9000). 
 149. See Austin Frakt et al., Our Flawed but Beneficial Medicaid Program, 
364 NEW ENG. J. MED. e31(1), at e31(1)–(2) (2011) (demolishing arguments 
made by some researchers that Medicaid is associated with poorer health 
outcomes). 
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Medicaid’s enormous and positive impact on health and health 
care among the poor and medically vulnerable.150 
Even as stakeholders sought to make the factual case for 
expansion, the Administration searched throughout 2013 for 
possible ways to navigate through the morass. Its first foray, 
which appeared to persuade few, was to clarify that states 
could opt out of the expansion, or in the alternative, adopt it 
and drop coverage later.151 But treating the expansion as 
temporary raises a host of practical and political difficulties 
and does not seem to have factored into any state’s thinking. 
Perhaps the most notable incentives the Administration 
has dangled have consisted of two strategies. The first has been 
a promise to consider state coverage and management 
innovations (accomplished through demonstration waivers 
under section 1115 of the Social Security Act)152 as part of an 
overall expansion strategy.153 The Administration has quietly 
signaled to states that it will consider reforms in benefit 
design, cost-sharing, freedom of choice, and other aspects of 
Medicaid administration (for both traditional low-income 
groups such as parents and children, as well as newly eligible 
                                                          
 150. For some of the most recent, and finest, reviews of Medicaid’s impact 
on health, health care, and health care costs, see TERESA A. COUGHLIN ET AL., 
URBAN INST., ARE STATE MEDICAID MANAGED CARE PROGRAMS READY FOR 
2014? A REVIEW OF EIGHT STATES 8–10 (2013), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2013/rwjf406305 
(using national data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to assess the 
impact of Medicaid on access, health care use, and financial protections for the 
low income population); see also Katherine Baicker et al., The Oregon 
Experiment—Effect of Medicaid on Clinical Outcomes, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1713, 1718–21 (2013) (finding reductions in depression, improvements in 
protection against financial catastrophe, but not measurable short-term gains 
in certain clinical measures of adult health); Benjamin D. Sommers et al., 
Mortality and Access to Care Among Adults After State Medicaid Expansions, 
367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1025, 1029–33 (2012) (finding more generous adult 
Medicaid eligibility levels associated with reduced mortality from preventable 
causes). 
 151. Dylan Scott, CMS: States Could Adopt Medicaid Expansion, Then 
Drop It, GOVERNING (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.governing.com/news/
federal/gov-cms-no-deadline-for-state-decisions-on-medicaid-expansion.html. 
 152. See generally ARTIGA, supra note 109 (explaining Affordable Care Act 
§ 1115 Medicaid and CHIP waivers and recommending issues for the Obama 
Administration to consider). 
 153. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET IN 
BRIEF 84 (2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/budget/fy2014/fy-2014-
budget-in-brief.pdf. 
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groups) as part of a state’s adult expansion initiative.154 This 
approach, which opens the door potentially to slimmer benefits, 
higher cost sharing, and greater use of structured managed-
care arrangements, essentially signals to the states that the 
Administration is ready to let them significantly restructure 
Medicaid if the restructuring is carried out in the context of 
expansion.155 The hope obviously is that with sufficient 
“innovation,” the growth of the entitlement itself will be seen as 
more palatable. Indeed, apart from demonstration innovation, 
the Administration has sought to lure states into greater 
support for Medicaid through other reforms aimed at granting 
more leeway in the use of techniques, such as greater cost-
sharing, to deter what is perceived as unnecessary or wasteful 
spending.156 
The strategy that unquestionably has received the most 
attention has been one that actually makes use of a long-
standing state option to use Medicaid funds to purchase private 
health insurance, but that recast the option in the context of a 
newly established individual insurance market environment.157 
Under this strategy, the HHS Secretary has clarified that she 
will make federal funding available to states that elect to enroll 
some or all low-income beneficiaries into “qualified health 
plans” (QHPs)158 sold in Health Insurance Marketplaces159 
                                                          
 154. See generally ROBIN RUDOWITZ & LAURA SNYDER, KAISER COMM’N ON 
MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING IN MEDICAID 
(2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/
2013/02/8416.pdf (describing the status of premiums and cost-sharing under 
the AIA); see also Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs, and 
Exchanges, 78 Fed. Reg. 4594, 4623–29 (Jan. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pts. 430, 431, 433, et al., 45 C.F.R pt. 155) (discussing the inclusion of 
new groups and the states’ option to be flexible with the Act). 
 155. Cf. Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs, and Exchanges, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 4629–30 (describing states’ flexibility in designing benefit 
packages as part of Medicaid expansion). 
 156. See id. at 4675 (“We believe these proposed policies would encourage 
less costly care and decreased use of unnecessary services, which may reduce 
state and federal costs for the specified services.”); see also RUDOWITZ & 
SNYDER, supra note 154 (discussing the proposed cost-sharing changes). 
 157. See Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Medicaid to Buy 
Private Health Insurance—The Great New Experiment?, 369 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 7 (2013), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/
NEJMp1304170. 
 158. See Glossary, Qualified Health Plan, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/qualified-health-plan/ (last visited Oct. 5, 
2013). 
2014] CAN THIS MARRIAGE BE SAVED? 199 
 
rather than into traditional Medicaid coverage arrangements—
that is, standard fee-for-service coverage or Medicaid-managed 
care plans.160 
The availability of Medicaid financing to purchase 
insurance for beneficiaries across all coverage groups is as old 
as the Medicaid statute itself. The 1965 statute,161 in directing 
the Secretary to make payments to states to support the cost of 
medical assistance, defined allowable costs as including state 
expenditures for both Medicare Part B premiums and “other 
insurance premiums for medical or any other type of remedial 
care or the cost thereof . . . ”162 Twenty-five years later, 
Congress amended the statute to explicitly promote the use of 
Medicaid to purchase employer-sponsored coverage where 
available, to the extent that it is cost-effective to do so.163 In 
enacting the employer amendments, Congress also recodified 
and preserved states’ original broad authority to buy 
insurance.164 Today, the definition of medical assistance itself 
includes explicit permission to states to use federal funds to 
purchase “other insurance premiums for medical or any other 
type of remedial care or the cost thereof.”165 
The language from these long-established Medicaid 
provisions formed the basis for federal guidance issued in late 
2012 clarifying the availability of federal funds for premium 
assistance.166 The ostensible purpose of the guidance, 
                                                          
 159. See generally ROBERT J. HILL ET AL., REED SMITH, ACA AFFORDABLE 
INSURANCE EXCHANGES AND QUALIFIED HEALTH PLANS (2013), available at 
http://www.healthindustrywashingtonwatch.com/uploads/file/Alert_Affordable
%20Ins%20Exchanges,%20Qualified%20Plans_03_14_2013.pdf (summarizing 
the structure of the marketplace for qualified health plans). 
 160. See Rosenbaum & Sommers, supra note 157. 
 161. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 
(1965). 
 162. Id. § 1903(a)(1). 
 163. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 
§ 4402, 104 Stat. 1388 (adding section 1906 to the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1396e (2006)). In the employer-sponsored coverage context, the 
federal government has defined cost-effective as shared premium costs 
between states and employers. Social Security Act § 1906(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396e(e)(2) (“The term ‘cost-effective’ has the meaning given that term in 
section 2105(c)(3)(A).”). 
 164. See generally Social Security Act Title XIX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396v 
(providing for grants to states for medical assistance programs). 
 165. Social Security Act § 1905(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006 & Supp. V 
2011). 
 166. See FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 124, at 15–16. 
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subsequently mirrored in federal regulations proposed in early 
2013,167 was to offer states a mechanism for potentially 
reducing health insurance “churn” between Medicaid and the 
Marketplace, a problem that is estimated to affect some 
twenty-eight million low-income adults and their families 
annually as a result of minor fluctuations in household income 
throughout the year.168 By purchasing QHP coverage, Medicaid 
agencies could effectively stabilize enrollment in a coverage 
arrangement that also serves as the source of coverage in the 
event that income increases. 
As it turned out, the availability of federal Medicaid 
financing to support premium assistance through the purchase 
of QHP enrollment had a sufficient ring of the new and sexy 
about it to at least capture some states’ attention, especially 
Arkansas.169 QHP enrollment into the individual market was 
perceived as having the potential, in other words, to soften 
opposition among state lawmakers who otherwise would refuse 
the Medicaid expansion.170 Furthermore, the purchase of QHP 
coverage from Marketplace plans has at least the potential to 
help stabilize Marketplace risk pools since the population most 
likely to experience churn is younger, low-income workers.171 
From a practical point of view, buying QHP coverage 
probably would differ very little from buying coverage from a 
Medicaid-managed care plan offering “benchmark” coverage, 
which consists of the same essential health benefits sold 
through QHPs, with slightly more cost-sharing protection.172 At 
                                                          
 167. Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs, and Exchanges, 78 
Fed. Reg. 4594, 4624 (Jan. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 430, 431, 
433, et al., 45 C.F.R pt. 155) (describing proposed 42 C.F.R. § 435.1015 
premium assistance programs). 
 168. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid’s Next Fifty Years: Aligning an Old 
Program with the New Normal, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 329,  
333–34 (2013); see also Benjamin D. Sommers & Sara Rosenbaum, Issues in 
Health Reform: How Changes in Eligibility May Move Millions Back and Forth 
Between Medicaid and Insurance Exchanges, 30 HEALTH AFF. 228, 232 (2011). 
 169. See Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act: Premium Assistance, 
MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-Guidance/Downloads/
FAQ-03-29-13-Premium-Assistance.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) (discussing 
Arkansas specifically in CMS’s Q&A). 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. (discussing the characteristics of new enrollees). 
 172. See id.; Nat’l Council for Cmty. Behavioral Healthcare, Medicaid 
Benchmark Benefits in Health Reform: Improvements and Exemptions, 
THENATIONALCOUNCIL.ORG, http://homeless.samhsa.gov/ResourceFiles/
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the same time, a QHP purchasing strategy would resolve a 
problem confronting the fifteen states that still do not have a 
well-developed Medicaid-managed care industry,173 namely, 
what to do with millions of newly insured people who cannot 
enroll into any organized care system with a functional 
provider network in these states (indeed, Arkansas offers a 
case in point174). Viewed in this way, a strategy of using 
Medicaid as premium support for QHP enrollment resolves a 
complex operational problem.175 Of course, it is not possible to 
say how many issuers and their provider networks will be 
willing to cross over and sell in the Medicaid market. But a 
number of Medicaid-managed care companies appear to be 
eager to move into the QHP market,176 and so the prospects for 
multi-market plans may be decent in those states with 
Medicaid managed care already in place. In states that have no 
managed-care experience such as Arkansas, the potential for 
market growth—assuming that the state focuses its premium 
support on younger, healthier working populations—would 
appear to be good.177 
To further the use of premium support, the Administration 
has clarified in guidance that its premium assistance policy is 
intended for use in the case of beneficiaries who qualify for 
Medicaid based on low family income rather than medical 
frailty,178  and furthermore, that enrollment in private coverage 
must be voluntary for beneficiaries unless the use of premium 
assistance (a state option) is coupled with a time-limited, 
Section 1115 compulsory-enrollment demonstration waiver.179 
Proposed premium assistance regulations issued in January 
                                                          
Medicaid%20Benchmark%20Coverage%20Health%20Reform.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2013). 
 173. COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 150, at 2 (“In 2010, all but 15 states had 
comprehensive risk-based Medicaid managed care programs . . . .”). 
 174. Sarah Kliff, Arkansas’s Unusual Plan to Expand Medicaid, WASH. 
POST WONKBLOG (Feb. 28, 2013, 3:24 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/28/arkansass-different-plan-to-expand-medicaid/. 
 175. Cf. Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act: Premium Assistance, supra 
note 169. 
 176. See COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 150, at 6 (“Many, but not all, of the 
managed care health plans interviewed for this study suggested that they 
would participate in their state’s Exchange.”). 
 177. Rosenbaum, supra note 168, at 344–45. 
 178. Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act: Premium Assistance, supra 
note 169. 
 179. Id. 
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2013 as part of a larger set of Medicaid regulations180 stipulate 
four conditions on the use of Medicaid to finance premium 
assistance in the context of the ACA,181 all of which are 
intended to foster the integration of expanded Medicaid 
coverage with Marketplace coverage in order to foster 
alignment between two markets and reduce the potential for 
inter-market churning.182 First, the insurance coverage must 
be primary to Medicaid in terms of coverage, with Medicaid 
acting as the primary payer only for items and services not 
falling within the essential health-benefit package that all 
QHP issuers must furnish.183 Second, because Medicaid 
beneficiaries enrolled in private insurance nonetheless remain 
Medicaid beneficiaries, states must continue to provide 
beneficiaries with the full scope of Medicaid coverage for items 
and services falling outside the essential health-benefit 
package but covered under the state plan.184 Third, states must 
adhere to Medicaid’s special cost-sharing protections, which are 
more generous than those established for Marketplace-
subsidized plans.185 Finally, and perhaps most significant from 
an operational perspective, the proposed rule specifies that 
“[t]he cost of purchasing such coverage, including 
administrative expenditures and the costs of providing 
wraparound benefits for items and services covered under the 
Medicaid State Plan, but not covered under the individual 
health plan, must be comparable to the cost of providing direct 
coverage under the State plan.”186 
Although states’ authority to use premium assistance is 
clear, the Administration’s proposed premium assistance policy 
raises a number of implementation issues.187 First, must health 
plans purchased using a premium-support approach comply 
with all federal and state requirements applicable to the 
                                                          
 180. FFP for Premium Assistance for Plans in the Individual Market, 78 
Fed. Reg. 4594, 4696 (proposed Jan. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
§ 435.1015). 
 181. Id. (disclosing the four conditions for financing premium assistance in 
proposed 42 C.F.R. § 435.1015(a)(1)–(4)). 
 182. Rosenbaum, supra note 168, at 334. 
 183. See FFP for Premium Assistance for Plans in the Individual Market, 
78 Fed. Reg. at 4696. 
 184. Id. (describing proposed § 435.1015(a)(2)). 
 185. Id. (describing proposed § 435.1015(a)(3)). 
 186. Id. (describing proposed § 435.1015(a)(4)). 
 187. See Rosenbaum, supra note 168, at 334. 
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purchase of traditional managed-care plans?188 Although the 
requirements applicable to Medicaid-managed care are similar, 
they are not identical.189 Does a premium-support agreement 
trigger the full complement of Medicaid conditions applicable to 
managed care arrangements? 
Second, how is the comparability of costs to be measured? 
As noted, the CBO cost estimates make clear that covering 
Medicaid beneficiaries through premium support will cost 50% 
more than traditional coverage.190 The basis for this difference 
is pretty obvious: if agencies buy insurance, they are paying 
premiums. They also are buying into coverage arrangements 
that tend to pay significantly higher provider fees.191 Given the 
obviously higher costs associated with private insurance, it is 
unclear how the comparability test can ever be satisfied. In 
Arkansas’s case, the state has suggested that its providers 
actually get paid by private insurers at rates not much higher 
than Medicaid.192 The state also has attempted to calculate the 
administrative savings that can be expected to flow from 
reduced churning,193 but the level of savings that can be 
achieved in relation to the added costs associated with 
enrollment in private insurance is unclear. Furthermore, the 
nominal costs associated with buying pricier coverage would 
rise further if the purchase of QHP policies stabilizes coverage 
                                                          
 188. See id. at 344–45. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See CBO ESTIMATES, supra note 8, at 4. 
 191. See AETNA, UNDERSTANDING HOW THE HEALTH INSURANCE 
PROVIDERS FEE AND TRANSITIONAL REINSURANCE CONTRIBUTION WILL 
AFFECT YOU 3–4 (2013), available at http://www.aetna.com/health-reform-
connection/documents/Aetna_HIP_RC_Brochure_FINAL.pdf. 
 192. See Jay Hancock, The Arkansas Medicaid Model: What You Need to 
Know About the ‘Private Option’, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2013/may/02/arkansas-medicaid-
private-option-faq.aspx; Kliff, supra note 174. 
 193. See MARYBETH MUSUMECI, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE 
UNINSURED, MEDICAID EXPANSION THROUGH PREMIUM ASSISTANCE: KEY 
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WAIVER PROPOSAL 6 (2013), available at 
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/8459-medicaid-
expansion-through-premium-assistance.pdf (“Arkansas’ proposal states that it 
seeks to alleviate coverage gaps and differences in benefits and provider 
networks as individuals move back and forth between Medicaid and 
Marketplace coverage due to changes in income.”). 
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over time.194 Reduced churning improves coverage stability, but 
eliminating the on-off quality of insurance could be expected to 
result in additional costs.195 Over the 2014–2016 time period, 
when the federal contribution is at 100%, the additional costs 
associated with premium support would be borne fully by the 
federal government in the case of newly eligible 
beneficiaries.196 States would begin to incur costs after this 
date.197 Moreover, to the extent that premium support is 
extended to traditional low-income populations not covered by 
the enhanced payment (e.g., low-income parents and their 
minor children), the federal contribution would be at the 
regular level, and the states’ share accordingly would be 
higher.198 Whether these higher costs are enough to dissuade 
states from attempting premium support remains an unknown. 
Regardless of the questions raised by premium assistance, it 
would seem obvious that the value of allowing states to move 
forward in this fashion outweighs the challenges if the added 
flexibility is sufficient to encourage states to adopt the 
expansion. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The future of the Affordable Care Act rests on the extent to 
which two federalism relationships succeed. The first 
relationship, codified in the Public Health Service Act, 
establishes a regulatory partnership between the federal and 
state governments that covers the health insurance industry as 
a whole, as well as the special new Marketplaces for affordable 
insurance.199 Clearly, this relationship is not without its 
                                                          
 194. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 1402, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. 
 195. In the short term it is always less expensive to interrupt coverage for 
weeks if not months, since during the interruption periods, insured services 
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 198. Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act: Premium Assistance, supra 
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 199. See generally Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg to 300gg–
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complications, and its success turns on a delicate dance 
between the partners over questions of standards and 
enforcement.200 Despite the bumps and delicacy, the key value 
of the relationship is that if the state partner fails, the federal 
government is empowered to act, typically to nudge the state 
partner into action, but if necessary, to assure that national 
standards actually operate as national standards.201 
The second partnership, codified in Medicaid, can be 
thought of as a joint investment relationship. This relationship 
is much more long-lived with decades of bumpiness, but it has 
never hit quite the same level of rock bottom that has been 
reached in half the states under the ACA. From the time of 
Medicaid’s enactment it has been obvious that having to rely on 
state choices for covering the poor creates real problems; by 
their failure or refusal to invest, states had the power to 
dramatically reduce the program’s reach and investment.202 
Now, however, the problem has become critical. On 
January 1, 2014, a transformational era in U.S. health policy is 
set to begin when near-universal coverage is scheduled to 
commence.203 At the rate things are going, the transformation 
will be aborted in half of all states.204 In community after 
community, outreach efforts will produce hundreds and 
thousands of applicants who, given the realities of who is 
uninsured, will be especially likely to have such low household 
income that they will qualify for Medicaid.205 Indeed, 
regardless of whether one uses the initial CBO coverage 
projections or its more recent updated estimates, it is clear that 
                                                          
 200. See id. 
 201. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–22. 
 202. Cf. Rosenbaum, supra note 25, at 27–28 (“The federal Medicaid law 
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(2013), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/
Publications/Issue%20Brief/2013/1662_Keith_implementing_ACA_state_actio
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Medicaid accounts for half of the entire new enrollment under 
the law.206 States’ failure to adopt the expansions means that 
in these communities, a sizable number of applicants promised 
“no wrong door” (the parlance during health reform to signal 
near-universal availability of coverage) will find their 
applications rejected because they are too poor.207 
In the absence of a miraculous turn-around between the 
middle and the end of 2013, it is too late to hope for anything 
other than stories of widespread coverage denials. No one 
thought about a federal fallback, because federal policymakers 
were convinced as a matter of law that none was needed. The 
Supreme Court’s decision changed everything in this regard 
and made it essential to think about fallback approaches, 
assuming that future legislative reforms do become possible. 
What might a federal Medicaid fallback look like? 
Obviously, the fallback cannot involve the forced expenditure of 
funds by states on behalf of the newly eligible population 
without crossing the line into coercion. Nor can the fallback 
involve simply improving the incentives. Even if the enhanced 
federal funding were to be set at 100% permanently rather 
than declining slightly over time,208 a heightened payment 
would not suffice; in their cost estimates and court filings, state 
officials have actively argued that the enhanced federal-
financing formula is inadequate in two respects.209 First, they 
point out, the formula does not provide 100% contributions for 
administrative costs associated with the expansion, which may 
be considerable.210 Second, they note that the 100% 
contribution rate does not apply to offset costs associated with 
health reform’s “woodwork” effects, that is, costs associated 
with covering individuals who would have qualified for 
Medicaid under pre-expansion program rules and had never 
applied for help but did so in 2014 as a result of expanded 
                                                          
 206. See Ku, supra note 88. 
 207. See Ellie Sandmeyer, WSL Cherry-Picks Study to Attach Medicaid 
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outreach efforts.211 Whether these underestimates of the cost of 
expansion are correct, the point is that simply increasing the 
incentive for expansion is insufficient, not only because 
additional costs may accrue but because so much of the 
resistance now in evidence can be attributed to ideology devoid 
of factual basis. The facts in this case simply do not explain the 
behavior that is on display. 
Fashioning a federal Medicaid fallback in a post-reform 
world becomes far more feasible than previously, precisely 
because the ACA builds a companion, subsidized individual 
insurance market that is accessible regardless of health 
status,212 has a mechanism for adjusting the cost of coverage by 
family income,213 and offers a level of coverage that, although 
not as enriched as Medicaid, is broad.214 Marketplace products 
will cover a full range of preventive services without cost 
sharing.215 Cost-sharing assistance will be available for other 
covered items and services.216 And covered items and services 
will be comparable to that found in the small-group market, 
and special protections such as mental health parity and bans 
against discrimination in coverage based on disability will 
apply.217 To be sure, this level of coverage does not suffice for 
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 216. See, e.g., id. § 1513, 124 Stat. at 253 (providing for shared 
responsibility for employers regarding health coverage and discussing cost 
sharing). 
 217. Id. § 1302(b)(4)(D), 124 Stat. at 164 (“[T]he Secretary shall—ensure 
that health benefits established as essential not be subject to denial to 
208 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 15:1 
 
children and adults with serious, long-term health needs, but 
the people most likely to be injured by the nonexpansion states 
are, to a significant degree, very poor workers.218 Even 
individuals with more advanced health needs would be 
helped—although not as much as they might need—by 
Marketplace products. Finally, because the ACA contains 
provisions for risk adjustment across the insurance market in 
order to ensure that adverse selection into qualified health 
plans sold in the Marketplace does not sink it,219 using QHP 
coverage as a fallback for the poorest individuals becomes even 
more feasible. 
Two models of the fallback might be considered. In the 
first, the federal government would simply assume 100% 
responsibility for all newly eligible individuals and enroll them 
in qualified health plans. In the second, the federal government 
could offer states the option of managing coverage for the 
expansion group, just as they manage their state plans 
generally, but reimburse states 100% permanently for costs 
associated with this group. In this way, those states that do 
wish to expand, as half have done, would continue to play the 
primary role in coverage and administration. But as with the 
Public Health Service Act, states that do not wish to administer 
the coverage expansion could opt for federal administration, 
just as states can opt for a federal Marketplace or federal 
management of insurance reforms today. 
Of course, nothing gets done in Washington by way of 
investment if there is no source of financing. Two sources come 
to mind to cover the cost of a complete federalization of the 
expansion costs. One source might be a small reduction of 
federal funds otherwise payable for current Medicaid programs. 
While the federal government could not require states to pay 
their own funds to add the new expansion group, there is no 
reason, under coercion theory, why the federal government 
could not slightly alter the terms of its current contribution to 
state programs. The federal contribution to Medicaid 
                                                          
individuals against their wishes on the basis of the individuals’ . . . present or 
predicted disability . . . .”). 
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constantly rises and falls as state circumstances change and as 
broader economic conditions evolve. Since the federal 
government has already committed to 90% federal contribution 
to the expansion population in perpetuity, the reduction on 
contributions to current state programs would be quite 
modest.220 
Another source of funding might be a further expansion of 
the so-called “Cadillac tax,”221 that is, the additional tax that 
will be paid by health plans considered to have excessive value 
under the Act. Currently, the tax is set to hit plans, beginning 
in 2018, with a value of $10,200 in the case of individual plans 
and $27,500 in the case of family coverage.222 The tax threshold 
could be lowered slightly in order to help offset the increment 
necessary to increase federal financing for the newly eligible 
group to 100%. Other possible sources of revenue might be a 
slight increase in the medical device tax or a tax on insurers 
themselves. 
Perhaps states eventually will come around, especially 
once they actually start to face the financial, social, and moral 
consequences in 2014 of having excluded their own residents 
from health reform. It is also true that the lack of a federal 
fallback to compensate for low Medicaid coverage has always 
been one of Medicaid’s most serious problems, and no solution 
previously has been devised. However, health reform raises the 
ante, not only by intensifying the pain of state choices but also 
by creating the potential for a thoroughly workable fallback in 
the event that states do not expand. We owe it to ourselves as a 
nation, not to mention to the poor, to at least try. 
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